Executive Summary
In early 2026, a novel class of fileless malware—dubbed StealthExec—has emerged as a critical threat to enterprise environments, particularly those relying on Windows endpoints with Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions. Unlike traditional malware that drops executable files, StealthExec operates entirely in memory using Windows Kernel Callbacks, enabling it to evade both signature-based and behavioral detection mechanisms. This malware leverages undocumented kernel APIs and signed driver abuse to achieve persistence and silently exfiltrate NTLM hashes via forged HTTP requests. Our analysis reveals that StealthExec represents a paradigm shift in adversarial tradecraft, combining advanced evasion with operational stealth to compromise high-value targets. Organizations must urgently reassess their kernel-level defenses, monitor kernel callback registrations, and adopt hardware-enforced isolation (e.g., Intel TDX, AMD SEV-SNP) and memory integrity monitoring to mitigate this threat.
KeUserModeCallback, ObRegisterCallbacks) to manipulate process and thread states from user mode.StealthExec is typically delivered via a phishing email containing a malicious Office document or ISO archive. Upon user interaction, a macro or embedded script triggers the execution of a PowerShell or Mshta payload. Crucially, this payload does not write executable files to disk. Instead, it spawns a child process (e.g., svchost.exe) and injects shellcode directly into its memory space using process hollowing or reflective DLL injection.
The shellcode then registers a custom kernel callback using KeRegisterUserModeCallback—an undocumented Windows kernel routine—to intercept system events such as process creation, thread creation, and registry modification. By operating at this level, StealthExec gains visibility into system state transitions without being hooked by EDRs, which typically monitor at the user-mode API layer (e.g., NtCreateProcess).
StealthExec registers multiple callbacks to achieve persistence and stealth:
lsass.exe) without spawning new executables.HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services to load a malicious kernel driver on boot.These callbacks are registered with minimal overhead and are not exposed via standard tools like fltmc or sc query, making detection via conventional means nearly impossible without kernel-mode instrumentation.
To escalate privileges and maintain control, StealthExec exploits a Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) technique. It loads a legitimate but vulnerable kernel driver (e.g., a graphics or storage driver with known memory corruption flaws) to gain kernel-level access. Once elevated, it disables PatchGuard and Virtualization-Based Security (VBS) by patching kernel structures, enabling unfettered access to the NTLM authentication stack.
Notably, StealthExec avoids modern security features like HVCI (Hypervisor-Protected Code Integrity) by targeting older, signed drivers still present in enterprise environments due to legacy software dependencies.
The primary goal of StealthExec is to extract NTLM hashes from the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (lsass.exe). It does so by:
lsass.exe via the registered PsCreateProcessNotifyRoutine, hijacking the authentication flow.net use \\attacker-server or SMB session setup) using stolen credentials.SpLsaModeInitialize.The exfiltration traffic is encrypted and fragmented to avoid deep packet inspection, and domains are dynamically generated using DGA (Domain Generation Algorithms) to evade blacklisting.
StealthExec employs several advanced evasion techniques:
EPROCESS, ETHREAD) to hide processes and threads from the scheduler and tools.StealthExec poses an existential risk to organizations with mature EDR deployments. Its ability to:
...makes it a prime tool for Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs), ransomware operators, and cybercriminal syndicates targeting intellectual property, financial data, and critical infrastructure. The exfiltration of NTLM hashes enables Golden Ticket attacks if the domain controller is later compromised, leading to full domain takeover.
Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Callback/CallbackObjects) and alert on unexpected callbacks.