Executive Summary: As of March 2026, a new class of fileless malware has emerged, specifically targeting Windows 12 systems by leveraging PowerShell 7.5+ to establish persistent, registry-based infections. Unlike traditional malware that relies on executable binaries, this threat operates entirely in memory and registry keys, evading detection by conventional endpoint protection solutions. Threat actors are weaponizing novel PowerShell cmdlets and .NET 9 integration to achieve stealth persistence, lateral movement, and data exfiltration. This report analyzes the attack vector, propagation mechanisms, and mitigation strategies for organizations operating in high-risk environments.
The attack begins with an initial compromise—typically through phishing, compromised RMM tools, or exploitation of CVE-2025-41234 (a zero-day in Windows Script Host). Once a foothold is established, the attacker executes a PowerShell 7.5+ script that:
Set-ItemProperty to write a Base64-encoded payload into HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run as a REG_SZ value.Start-Process -WindowStyle Hidden with the -WorkingDirectory flag set to a non-existent path to avoid file system artifacts.System.Reflection.Assembly.Load.In Windows 12, PowerShell 7.5+ includes enhanced registry interaction APIs and supports PSReadLine history logging suppression, making it ideal for covert operations. The use of PSDefaultParameterValues allows attackers to obfuscate malicious commands within legitimate scripts.
While Run and RunOnce keys remain primary vectors, attackers are also exploiting:
Set-WmiInstance -Class __EventFilter and __EventConsumer to trigger PowerShell upon system boot or user logon.HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tasks and executed without visible XML files.HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows.These registry-only persistence methods are undetectable by file integrity monitoring (FIM) tools that only watch for file changes.
The malware leverages several advanced evasion tactics:
[Ref].Assembly.GetType('System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils').GetField('amsiInitFailed','NonPublic,Static').SetValue($null,$true) to disable AMSI in PowerShell 7.5.VirtualAlloc and CreateThread via P/Invoke calls from within PowerShell.System.Net.Http.HttpClient) to avoid network-based detection.certutil.exe, msiexec.exe, and regsvr32.exe with URIs to fetch second-stage scripts.Most EDR solutions in 2026 still rely on behavioral AI trained on PowerShell 5.1 logs. They fail to detect PowerShell 7.5+ scripts due to lack of telemetry integration and encrypted command-line arguments.
This malware poses severe risks to:
Threat actors include state-sponsored groups (e.g., APT47 targeting European energy grids) and cybercriminal syndicates using ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) payloads delivered via this vector.
Organizations must adopt a multi-layered defense strategy:
Start-Process, Invoke-Expression).Run, RunOnce, WMI\Event, and Schedule\TaskCache keys.regsvr32, msiexec, and certutil via AppLocker or WDAC.WindowStyle Hidden).Get-WmiObject -Namespace root\subscription.HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall where malware may hide under fake GUIDs.